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CLS Bank: Managing Foreign
Exchange Settlement Risk
Paul Miller, Department of Banking Operations, and Carol Ann Northcott, Department
of Monetary and Financial Analysis
• Based in New York City and regulated by
the Federal Reserve Board, CLS Bank Inter-
national provides a “continuous linked
settlement” (CLS) service for foreign exchange
transactions.
• The CLS Bank virtually eliminates the credit
risk associated with settling foreign exchange
transactions.
• TheCanadian dollarisone ofsevencurrencies
settling through the CLS Bank system.
• The Bank of Canada provides the CLS Bank
with a settlement account and acts on its
behalf in Canada’s Large Value Transfer
System (LVTS). The Canadian-dollar
operations of the CLS Bank are subject to
Bank of Canada oversight under the Payment
Clearing and Settlement Act.
• TheCLS Bankbeganoperationson9September
2002.
ith an average turnover of approximately
US$1.2 trillion, the foreign exchange
market is the largest ﬁnancial market in
theworld(BIS2002).1Settlementofthese
transactions spans different national and legal juris-
dictions, time zones, and domestic payments systems.
As a result, counterparties assume various types of
risk in the course of settlement, including credit,
liquidity, replacement, legal, banker, and operational
risks. (See Box 1 for deﬁnitions.) Together, these con-
stitute foreign exchange settlement risk, with credit
risk being the most signiﬁcant. It has been internation-
ally acknowledged for some time that disruptions in
the settlement of foreign exchange transactions have
the potential to pose systemic risk, since the risks
taken on by counterparties can extend over several
days and be very large, even exceeding their capital
(BIS 1996).
The CLS Bank virtually eliminates
the credit risk associated with settling
foreign exchange transactions by
providingapayment-versus-payment
arrangement.
After a decade-long effort by the international financial
community, a new bank has been created to address
risk in the settlement of foreign exchange transactions.
The CLS Bank virtually eliminates the credit risk asso-
ciated with settling foreign exchange transactions by
providing a payment-versus-payment arrangement.
1.  Daily turnover in April 2001.
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History and Evolution
Foreign exchange traders make agreements to
exchange one currency for another in various types
of transactions. To understand how a typical foreign
exchange transaction is settled without the CLS Bank,
consider the example in Chart 1, involving two banks.
Bank A, in Japan, is a participant in the Japanese large-
value payments system, the BOJ-NET. Bank B, in
Canada, is a participant in the Canadian large-value
payments system, the LVTS. Bank A and Bank B enter
into a foreign exchange transaction when Bank A sells
yen to Bank B for Canadian dollars.
To settle the transaction, Bank A will pay Bank B the
yen through the BOJ-NET. If Bank B is not a participant
in the BOJ-NET, it must engage a participating bank to
receive the payment on its behalf. This is Bank B’s cor-
respondent,ornostro,bank.Likewise,BankBwillpay
Canadian dollars to Bank A through the LVTS, to Bank
A’s nostro bank.2 Thus, each counterparty pays one
currency and receives another in return.
2.  The terms “nostro” and “correspondent” are used interchangeably
throughout this article. Nostro is the term generally used by the CLS Bank.
In settling this exchange, the counterparties assume a
number of risks. One source of risk becomes especially
clear when payments systems are in different time
zones.3 In the example, Bank A pays the yen through
3.  In the example in Chart 1, the operating hours are in Central European
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Box 1: Deﬁnitions of Types of Risk
Banker’s risk
The risk that the bank where your settlement
account is held could become insolvent.
Credit risk
The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obli-
gationfor full value, either when due or at any time
thereafter.
Liquidity risk
The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obli-
gation for full value when due but will settle at
some unspeciﬁed time thereafter.
Operational risk
The risk that deﬁciencies in information systems or
in internal controls, human errors, or management
failures will cause or exacerbate credit or liquidity
risks.
Source: BIS (2001) unless otherwise indicated.
Principal (Herstatt) risk
The risk that one counterparty of a two-way trans-
action could pay the sold currency without receiv-
ing the bought currency (BIS 1996).
Replacement risk:
The risk that a counterparty to an outstanding
transaction for completion at a future date will fail
to perform on the settlement date. This failure may
leave its counterparty with an unhedged or open
market position. The resulting exposure is the cost
of replacing, at current market prices, the original
transaction (BIS 1996).
Systemic risk
The risk that the failure of one participant in a
ﬁnancial system to meet its required obligations
will cause other ﬁnancial institutions to be unable
to meet their obligations when due.
Box 1
Deﬁnitions of Types of Risk
Banker risk
The risk that the bank where a settlement account
is held could become insolvent.
Credit risk
The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obli-
gation for full value, either when due or at any time
thereafter (BIS 2001).
Liquidity risk
The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obli-
gation for full value when due but will settle at
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Operational risk
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Principal (Herstatt) risk
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Replacement risk
The risk that a counterparty to an outstanding
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to perform on the settlement date. This failure may
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market position. The resulting exposure is the cost
of replacing, at current market prices, the original
transaction (BIS 1996).
Systemic risk
The risk that the failure of one participant in a
ﬁnancial system to meet its required obligations
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the BOJ-NET before the Canadian payments system
is open. If Bank B defaults in the interim, Bank A will
have paid the yen but will not have received the Cana-
dian dollars. This is often termed “principal,” or
“Herstatt,” risk, which is a type of credit risk (Box 2).
As well, because of limitations on current  informa-
tion-management practices, it can take several days
from the time a counterparty initiates the process to
pay the “sold” currency until it knows for certain
whether it has received the “bought” currency, sub-
jecting it to liquidity risk and replacement risk if the
bought currency arrives later than expected. Since
countries have different legal and regulatory regimes,
legal risk may also be a factor in the event that a
counterparty fails to deliver a currency.
The risks associated with foreign exchange settle-
ments and their potential to cause systemic risk (the
risk that a failure of one institution to meets its obliga-
tions will cause other institutions to fail to meet their
obligations) were demonstrated by the high-proﬁle
closure of Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974 (Box 2). Since this
episode, much has been done to understand and
reduce the risks involved in foreign exchange settle-
ments. In 1990, the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) addressed two issues concerning cross-border,
multi-currency netting schemes that could be used to
settle foreign exchange transactions in its Report of the
Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of the Central
Banks of the Group of Ten Countries (the “Lamfalussy
Report”). First, to minimize risk in these systems, the
committee formulated six minimum standards for
their safe operation. 4 Second, it recognized that cross-
4. Although these standards were originally designed to help ensure adequate
risk management of cross-border, multi-currency netting systems, they came
to be applied to netting systems more generally and eventually provided the
base on which the Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems
were constructed (BIS 2001).
border transactions involving national payments sys-
tems would require increased interaction among vari-
ous supervisory authorities. The committee therefore
recommended that central banks and other relevant
supervisory authorities adopt certain principles to
coordinate the oversight of cross-border, multi-cur-
rency netting schemes. This co-operative framework
was eventually adopted for the regulatory approval
process of the CLS Bank (see Appendix).
In 1996, the BIS publication, Settlement Risk in Foreign
Exchange Transactions (the “Allsopp Report”), pre-
sented a market survey of banks’ practices for settling
foreign exchange trades. There were three key ﬁnd-
ings.
• The exposures that arise from foreign exchange
settlement can extend over several days.
• At any given moment, the amount of risk to even
a single counterparty may exceed a bank’s capital.
• Foreign exchange settlement risk is a potential
source of systemic risk.
To reduce risk, the report advocated a strategy that
included roles for private sector as well as for central
banks. The major task was given to industry groups
in the financial sector: to develop a risk-proof, multi-
currency settlement system that would establish a
direct relationship between the payments of the two
currencies involved in a foreign exchange transaction. 5
In July 1997, a group of the world’s largest foreign-
exchange-dealing banks joined to create CLS Services
Limited to implement their vision of a limited-purpose
5.  Industry groups had already been actively investigating foreign exchange
risk. See, for example, the 1997 publication from the New York Foreign
Exchange Committee, “Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Settlement Netting.”
Box 2
Bankhaus Herstatt
The potential for risk in foreign exchange settle-
ment was brought into vivid relief by the closure of
a bank in Cologne, Germany, that, although small,
was very active in the foreign exchange market.
WhenBankhausHerstatthaditslicencewithdrawn
at the end of the German banking day on 26 June
1974, it was 10:30 a.m. for its New York correspond-
ent. Several of Herstatt’s counterparties had irrevo-
cably paid Deutsche Marks to the bank that day
through the German payments system, with the
expectation of receiving U.S.-dollar funds through
Herstatt’s correspondent bank in New York later
that day. However, with the bank’s closure, its New
York correspondent froze outgoing U.S.-dollar pay-
ments, leaving Herstatt’s counterparties exposed
for the full value of the Deutsche Mark payments
already made. This type of credit risk has come to
be known as “Herstatt” or “principal” risk.16 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2002
bank to provide a type of payment-versus-payment set-
tlement called “continuous linked settlement” (CLS).6
The Continuous Linked Settlement
Service
Based in New York, the CLS Bank is a special-purpose
bank designed speciﬁcally to settle foreign exchange
transactions through its continuous linked settlement
service. Currently, seven currencies can be settled
through the system: the Australian, Canadian, and
U.S. dollars; the euro; the yen; the Swiss franc; and
the pound sterling. The CLS service involves various
players, all connected by a sophisticated telecom-
munications infrastructure (Box 3).
Both sides of a foreign exchange trade
. . . are settled simultaneously on a
trade-by-trade basis.
6. In December 1997, CLS Services merged with two other initiatives already
in existence, ECHO and Multinet, and, in the process, gave the industry one
dominant initiative to reduce risk in foreign exchange settlements.
Both sides of a foreign exchange trade submitted to,
and accepted by, the CLS Bank are settled simultane-
ously on a trade-by-trade basis across accounts that
ﬁnancial institutions (settlement members) hold at the
CLS Bank.7 Settlement members pay currencies owed
to accounts the CLS Bank holds at central banks
through domestic payments systems that have been
approved by the CLS Bank. Currencies that are due
to settlement members are paid out by the CLS Bank
in the same fashion. Nostro banks make and receive
payments for members as necessary. Liquidity providers
are ﬁnancial institutions that enter into arrangements
with the CLS Bank to help protect it from liquidity risk
and are an important part of the CLS Bank’s risk-
management controls.
Daily operations
The CLS settlement cycle (Box 4) extends over a time
period when all the domestic payments systems of
currencies settling through the system are open for
7.  Financial institutions can participate in the CLS Bank in three ways: as set-
tlement members, user members, or third-party users. But only settlement
members can hold settlement accounts at the CLS Bank. User members and
third-party users access the system through a settlement member, and their
obligations are settled through the settlement member’s account.
Box 3
The CLS Environment
CLS Group Holdings AG is a private holding com-
pany incorporated in Switzerland and regulated in
the United States by the Federal Reserve as a bank
holding company. Its Board of Directors is respon-
sible for the strategic decisions of the whole CLS
group. As of 9 September 2002, there were 66 share-
holders, among them the world’s largest foreign-
exchange-dealing banks. CLS Group Holdings AG
wholly owns CLS UK Intermediate Holdings Ltd.,
which is headquartered in London and owns two
main subsidiaries: CLS Bank International and CLS
Services Ltd. The CLS Bank is an Edge Act corpora-
tion based in New York and is regulated as a bank
by the Federal Reserve. CLS Services is incorpo-
rated under British law and provides operational
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business.8 The accounts that settlement members hold
at the CLS Bank are divided into subaccounts, one for
each currency approved to settle through the system.
At the beginning and end of each settlement cycle,
these accounts, and the CLS Bank’s settlement accounts
at central banks, hold zero value.
The CLS settlement cycle extends
over a time period when all the
domestic payments systems of
currencies settling through the
system are open for business.
Foreign exchange trades submitted to the CLS Bank
for settlement in the upcoming settlement cycle must
be received prior to a submission deadline. Those
trades that are submitted before the deadline and are
accepted (i.e., those that pass the CLS Bank’s matching
and processing ﬁlters) are randomly placed in a queue
for settlement. Each settlement member’s expected
ﬁnal position in each of the currencies is then calcu-
lated, assuming that all accepted trades settle. 9 These
ﬁnal amounts are communicated to members via a
pay-in schedule that outlines for the member the value
of the currencies that it owes, when the currencies are
due, and the value of the currencies that it will receive.
Settlement members pay the owed currencies, called
pay-ins, to the CLS Bank’s accounts at the various
central banks through the appropriate CLS Bank-
approved payments system (APS) that supports intra-
day finality of payments.10 If a member is not a partici-
pant in the APS of a particular currency it must have a
participating institution (its nostro agent) make and
receive payments on its behalf. After a pay-in is
received in its central bank account, the CLS Bank
8. Because the CLS Bank settlement cycle crosses several different time zones,
it has set its hours of operation to maximize the overlap when the domestic
payments systems are open. The Central European Time zone (CET) is typi-
cally used when discussing CLS Bank operations.
9.  These ﬁnal balances are analogous to the results that would be obtained
from multilaterally netting all trades.
10.  Intraday ﬁnality means that ﬁnal settlement (the irrevocable transfer of
funds) occurs within a very short period of time.
adjusts the member’s CLS Bank subaccount accord-
ingly.
Once the pay-ins to the CLS Bank begin, the trades
start to settle on a trade-by-trade basis. Each trade is
subject to three risk-management controls, discussed
in the next section. After a trade passes these controls,
the CLS Bank simultaneously adjusts the subaccounts
of the bought and sold currencies for both settlement
members. Settlement of the trade is then ﬁnal. The
next trade in the queue is then tested against the risk-
management controls, and so on. Any trade that does
not pass the tests is left in the queue and is tested each
timetheprocesscyclesthrough.Thesystemisdesigned
so that if all members make the required payments to
the CLS Bank, all accepted trades will settle.
The CLS Bank pays the expected ﬁnal balances of cur-
rencies owed to settlement members from its central
bank accounts throughout the settlement cycle accord-
ing to a process that incorporates the risk-manage-
ment controls. As these pay-outs are completed, both
the CLS Bank’s central bank account and the receiving
settlement member’s CLS Bank subaccount are
adjusted accordingly.
Once the CLS settlement cycle is complete, there
should be no value left in the CLS Bank’s central bank
accounts or in members’ CLS Bank subaccounts. As a
result, the CLS Bank holds no assets or liabilities vis-à-
vis central banks or settlement members once a settle-
ment cycle is completed.
Risk Management
The CLS Bank settles foreign exchange transactions
across settlement accounts it provides to its members.
Since the CLS Bank is a private sector enterprise, as
opposed to a central bank, there is a risk that the
CLS Bank could fail (i.e., banker risk). For this to be
acceptable to participants and to the central bank com-
munity, this risk must be minimized. In the CLS Bank,
transactions will settle with ﬁnality, and pay-outs of
some long positions will be made before all the amounts
due to the CLS Bank to support the settlement are
received. Therefore, the CLS Bank must be protected
from the various risks that could arise throughout the
process: credit risk, liquidity risk, legal risk, banker
risk, and operational risk.
To address credit and liquidity risk, three risk-man-
agement controls are applied to each trade before it
is settled. These mechanisms ensure that, in virtually18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2002
Box 4
The CLS Bank’s Settlement Cycle
The following gives the target times for CLS processing under normal conditions for value date V.
Sydney Frankfurt Ottawa
Submission of instructions, processing,
and matching1
0800 0000 1800 (midnight, V) Initial pay-in schedule sent out2
1430 0630 0030 Revised pay-in schedule sent out2
1500 0700 0100 Pay-in,2 settlement,3 and pay-out process4
begins
1600 0800 0200 First pay-ins due2
1700 0900 0300 Settlement complete3
1800 1000 0400 Pay-ins2 and pay-outs4 completed for
Asian Paciﬁc currencies
2000 1200 (noon) 0600 Pay-ins2 and pay-outs4 completed for all currencies
The Processing Schedule for Canada (EDT)
1. Submission of instructions
The process is ongoing. Participants submit pay-
ment instructions for foreign exchange transac-
tions to be settled that value date (V), usually
before 1800, but instructions are permitted up to
the 0030 deadline.
CLS Services processes the instructions; for
example, it authenticates and validates speciﬁc
information ﬁelds and then passes the instruc-
tions through a regulatory ﬁlter. Pairs of eligible
instructions are matched based on members,
type and quantity of currency, and value date.
Members are notiﬁed whether or not the instruc-
tions matched. Unmatched instructions can be
amended (by 0030) or removed.
2. Pay-in process
Settlement members receive two pay-in sched-
ules: an initial one at 1800 and a revised sched-
ule after 0030. The speciﬁed amounts must be
paid at or before the speciﬁed times.
The pay-in deadlines are spread throughout the
settlementcycleinone-hourintervals,beginning
at 0200. The ﬁnal payment deadline for the
Asian Paciﬁc currencies is at 0400 to ensure that
all pay-ins and pay-outs are completed before
the close of the payments systems for these cur-
rencies. All other currency pay-ins are com-
pleted by 0600.
3. Settlement process
After the initial pay-ins occur, ongoing settle-
ment of the individual instructions across the
books of the CLS Bank begins. Given the timing
of pay-ins and the risk-control mechanisms, the
settlement of all instructions should be com-
pleted by 0300.
4. Pay-out process
All pay-outs are to be made before the close of
the respective payments systems. By 0600, each
settlement member should have zero value in its
CLS Bank settlement account, and the CLS Bank
should have no funds in its central bank settle-
ment accounts.19 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2002
all circumstances, participants in the CLS Bank are
guaranteed receipt of either the currency transacted
for if the transaction has settled, or a refund of the
amount they contributed if the trade does not settle.11
To address credit and liquidity risk,
[for the CLS Bank] three risk-
management controls are applied to
each trade before it is settled.
Controls
Two controls protect the CLS Bank from credit risk.
•  First, and foremost, each settlement member’s
overall balance across all its subaccounts must
always be positive, even though at any time
during the settlement cycle some accounts will
have positive balances and some will have
negative balances. A member cannot owe value
to the CLS Bank overall. The bank calculates
the balances in a base currency using current
exchange rates. A discount (haircut) is applied to
the current rates to protect the CLS Bank from
exchange rate volatility.
• Second, a limit is imposed on the aggregate nega-
tive position that can be maintained across a
member’s subaccounts with negative balances.
This limit is assessed separately for each member
and reﬂects its credit, liquidity, and operational
characteristics. Settlement members considered
at higher risk than others will have more strin-
gent limits on their aggregate negative position.
A third and ﬁnal control protects the CLS Bank from
liquidity risk.
• A limit is applied to the negative position a settle-
ment member can have in the subaccount of each
currency. All members face the same limit for
a given currency. 12 These limits support the
CLS Bank’s ability to maintain the currencies
11.  In rare cases, the refund may be in a third currency, as discussed below.
12.  For example, the limit with respect to the Canadian dollar is currently
$400 million. No settlement member can have a negative position in its
Canadian-dollar subaccount greater than this amount.
required to meet its pay-out obligations and are
based on the value of the commitments from
liquidity providers, discussed below.
To protect itself from legal risk, the CLS Bank has
received legal opinions that the legal systems of all
jurisdictions with currencies settling through the
system can support the ﬁnality of transactions settling
across its books. In addition, all payments to the
CLS Bank from settlement members are made through
well-designed payments systems that support intra-
day ﬁnality. The CLS Bank holds these payments in
accounts at central banks, thus protecting itself from
banker risk.
Operational risk is another important risk that must
be managed. The CLS process requires a communica-
tions system that links it to numerous participants and
payments systems across countries, time zones, and
technologies. The CLS Bank shifts foreign exchange
settlement from a decentralized world to a highly cen-
tralized environment with explicit linkages. This,
along with the tight timeline necessary to complete
settlement, means that the outage of one component
could quickly cause problems throughout the system.
The CLS Bank, its member institutions, and central
banks all recognize the potential for operational risk
and have worked together to alleviate such concerns.
The CLS Bank has an explicit management plan for
operational failure that covers its various components
(technology processes, settlement members, approved
payments systems, etc.). All key components of the
CLS system have backup arrangements that can be up
and running within one hour. In addition, the opera-
tors of approved payments systems have developed
their own procedures for managing operational risk,
and they consider these issues together with the
CLS Bank to ensure common understanding and
effective coordination and communication in the
event of a problem.
Participants’ risk
Although the CLS Bank’s principal contribution to
risk management for its participants is the virtual
elimination of their credit risk, it also has the potential
to decrease replacement risk. Trades may fail to settle
in the CLS Bank, just as they do outside the system,
but the failure of CLS trades to settle will be known
sooner. This allows participants more time to make
alternative arrangements and thus decreases the risk
that the market will move against them in the interim.
Participants also continue to face some liquidity risk,
although this has been addressed in various ways.20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2002
• Since payments to the CLS Bank are based on the
expected ﬁnal balance in each of a member’s sub-
accounts, less liquidity is required than in a sys-
tem where payments are made on a gross basis.
• Payments of ﬁnal amounts to and from the CLS
Bank are spread out over the settlement cycle.
This increases the efﬁciency of liquidity in the
domestic markets, since liquidity will continue to
circulate throughout the cycle.
Despite these advantages, some liquidity concerns
remain. The payment obligations may still be quite
large, and payments must be made according to a
specific schedule. Therefore, large payments may
be required during a narrow window of time. There
are also concerns that during the initial period of the
CLS Bank’s operations, with relatively few settlement
members, there could be large spikes in the amounts
owing.
To address these concerns, participants can enter into
trades with each other to reduce their pay-in require-
ments. A settlement member that owes a large
amount of a particular currency can be matched with
another member that expects to receive a large
amount of another currency. The two can enter into a
currency trade that, when settled inside the CLS Bank,
decreases their ﬁnal owing and receiving positions,
respectively. An offsetting transaction is conducted
and settled outside the CLS Bank through the tradi-
tional foreign exchange settlement arrangement so
that, overall, each member continues to hold its origi-
nal position in each currency. Together, these two
transactions are called an inside/outside swap. While the
outside leg of the swap is subject to credit risk, it is
estimated that the amount of risk reintroduced will be
small compared with the overall risk reduction, and it
is hoped that this will only be a transitory feature.
Failure Management
A “failure” in the CLS process would occur if a settle-
ment member did not meet its obligations to pay for
currencies owed. This could have serious repercus-
sions for all settlement members if not adequately
controlled.13 Even in the event of such a failure, the
CLS Bank itself has protection from credit risk and, in
virtually all circumstances, can guarantee that settle-
ment members receive settled currencies or can make
refunds to members whose trades do not settle.
13.  This could happen for operational or credit reasons. Although the tools
discussed here can be used in either event, if the failure is operational, a series
of operational contingencies is also available.
When a settlement member does not meet its obliga-
tions, the CLS Bank can take the following steps.
• First, it will try to settle as many trades as possi-
ble between non-failing institutions by recalculat-
ing members’ positions and asking them to pay
the additional amounts indicated by the recalcu-
lation.
The original pay-in schedule outlined the expected
ﬁnal positions assuming all trades settle. If there is
a pay-in failure, all trades may not settle, and the
amounts owed to and due by members change.
The recalculated amounts, and who must pay them,
are determined according to criteria set out in the
CLS Bank’s rules.14 Although this procedure provides
members with the beneﬁt of settling trades that would
otherwise remain unsettled, the potential for unex-
pected pay-ins contributes to members’ liquidity risk.
• Liquidity providers support the CLS Bank’s abil-
ity to make payments in the required currencies.
Although the CLS Bank can continue to meet payment
obligations to members because of the risk-manage-
ment control requiring all members to maintain posi-
tive balances overall, in the event of a failure it may
not have enough of a speciﬁc currency. To mitigate
this, the CLS Bank has entered into agreements with
liquidity providers, ﬁnancial institutions in each coun-
try with a currency eligible for settlement. These
agreements commit the liquidity provider to sell or
swap a domestic currency with the bank up to a speci-
ﬁed amount.15 Thus, even if the CLS Bank does not
have enough of a required currency, it will have sufﬁ-
cient value in another currency to enter into a swap
with the relevant liquidity provider for the required
amount.
• A third currency can be paid out.
In the rare circumstance of more than one failure, or if
a liquidity provider does not meet its obligations, the
CLS Bank may have to meet its obligations by paying
out a third currency rather than one that was bought
or sold. Since they still receive value, settlement mem-
bers are protected from credit risk. They still experi-
ence liquidity risk, however, in not receiving the
expected currency. As well, if they need to enter into
14.  The CLS service is governed by CLS Bank International rules, which are
subject to English law.
15. The value of these commitments for a given currency determines the limit
applied to the negative balance that settlement members can have in their
subaccounts for that currency, as discussed earlier.21 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2002
foreign exchange transactions outside the CLS Bank to
get the desired currency, they may also experience
replacement and credit risk.
• A loss allocation can be assessed on members.
In the extremely rare event that a settlement member
fails and at the same time there is a foreign exchange
movement in excess of the haircuts, the CLS Bank may
not have enough value to meet its obligations. In this
case, a loss allocation can be assessed on settlement
members to make up the shortfall. This is the only
possibility—a very remote one—of members in the
CLS Bank incurring credit loss.
In sum, in a failure situation, members may face
liquidity pressures from unexpected increases in the
amounts that they may have to pay to the CLS Bank
and from the possibility of receiving an unexpected
currency. These liquidity pressures could be concen-
trated when a nostro agent acts for multiple settle-
ment members. If a settlement member fails and the
surviving members are faced with recalculated pay-in
requirements, it may be more difﬁcult for a nostro to
provide the required liquidity and to make the neces-
sary payments on behalf of all its clients. During its
development, the CLS Bank performed various
simulations of failures in the system, and settlement
members and nostro agents agreed that the additional
liquidity demands should be manageable.
Regulation and Supervision
The collective regulatory approval process for the
CLS Bank and its associated systems is based on the
principles of co-operative oversight set out in the
Lamfalussy Report. Since the CLS Bank is subject
to banking regulation by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Reserve Board,
supported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
is the lead overseer of the system in consultation with
the central banks of the currencies that will settle in
the bank. In that capacity, the Federal Reserve Board
has worked closely with the CLS Bank throughout
its development. General regulatory matters were
addressed within a committee of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements that included all the central banks
whose currencies, the so-called ﬁrst-wave currencies,
would settle in the CLS Bank as it began full commer-
cial operations. Central banks of potential second-
wave currencies (Box 5) were also involved in the
discussions.
Initially, the system was assessed according to the
Lamfalussy Report’s minimum standards, since these
Box 5
Eligible Currencies in the CLS Bank and the Relevant Approved Payments System
• Australian dollar Reserve Bank Information
and Transfer System (RITS)
• Canadian dollar Large Value Transfer
System (LVTS)
• Euro Trans European Automated
Real Time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer System
(TARGET) through the ECB
Payment Mechanism (EPM)




• Pound sterling Clearing House Automated
Payment System (CHAPS)
• Swiss franc Swiss Interbank Clearing
System (SIC)
• U. S. dollar Fedwire
Other currencies expected to gain approval




• Norwegian krone22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2002
were the generally accepted principles in place during
its early development. Eventually, however, the
core principles for systemically important payments
systems will likely also be applied (BIS 2001). Assess-
ments carried out by the BIS committee and by the
CLS Bank itself show that the system is designed to
meet the Lamfalussy standards that apply to it.
Regulatory approval began with formal approval
from each of the first-wave central banks to include
its currency in the CLS Bank. Following successful
trials, final regulatory approval from the Federal
Reserve Board was given on 5 September 2002 to
allow the system to begin commercial operations.
The Federal Reserve Board will continue to super-
vise the CLS Bank and its operations. Coordination
with other central banks will be ongoing.
Central banks have also addressed the creation of the
CLS Bank within their own regulatory environment.
In Canada, the CLS Bank has been designated under
the Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (PCSA) for
oversight by the Bank of Canada, since it is clearly a
systemically important payment system (Box 6).16
The CLS Bank has been designated
under the Payment Clearing and
Settlement Act (PCSA).
The Bank of Canada’s particular interest is in the
arrangements used to settle the Canadian-dollar
portion of foreign exchange transactions. Any actions
taken under the PCSA by the Bank of Canada will be
16.   See Goodlet (1997) for details on the Bank of Canada’s role in the over-
sight of payments systems designated under the PCSA. The formal notice of
designation was published in the Canada Gazette, Part 1, 7 September 2002.
Box 6
Deﬁning Systemic Risk in Canada
Under the PCSA, systemic risk is deﬁned as the risk
that the inability of a participant to meet its obliga-
tions in a clearing and settlement system could
cause
• other participants in the system to be unable
to meet their obligations when due
• ﬁnancial institutions in other parts of the
Canadian ﬁnancial system to be unable to
meet their obligations when due, or
• the clearing and settlement system’s clearing
house or the clearing house of another clear-
ing and settlement system to be unable to
meet its obligations when due
Characteristics that may indicate a system whose
failure could have substantial implications for the
ﬁnancial system and therefore bring it under close
scrutiny for designation:
• individual transactions on a given day in
excess of $200,000 and an aggregate value of
all transactions on any given day in excess of
$500 million, determined on a gross basis, or
• the size of the payment obligations owed to
and by the participants is signiﬁcant relative
to the participants’ capital. This would include
systems in which participants are owed funds
in excess of 25 per cent of capital or in which
they can owe funds to a clearing and settle-
ment system in excess of their capital, or
• the system plays a central role in supporting
transactions in the ﬁnancial markets or the
economy
Source: Guideline Related to Bank of Canada Oversight Activities under the
Payment Clearing and Settlement Act (1997) (available at: www.bankofcan-
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with respect to Canadian participants rather than with
the CLS Bank itself. The Bank of Canada is satisﬁed
that the system meets the minimum standards it has
set for designated systems and will continue its coor-
dination with the Federal Reserve Board and other
central banks.
The CLS Bank and the Canadian
Financial System
The Canadian players
The Canadian dollar is one of the ﬁrst seven curren-
cies settling through the CLS Bank. The approved
payments system is the Large Value Transfer System
(LVTS), which is owned and operated by the Canadian
Payments Association (CPA). 17 The Debt Clearing
Service (DCS), operated by the Canadian Depository
for Securities Ltd., will continue to support LVTS
collateral operations. Since the CLS settlement cycle
will take place during the North American overnight
period (Box 4), both the LVTS and the DCS have
extended their operating hours to begin 6.5 hours
earlier, at 0030 (EST).
Five Canadian banks are shareholders of CLS Group
Holdings AG: the Bank of Montreal, the Bank of Nova
Scotia, the CIBC, the Royal Bank of Canada, and TD
Canada Trust. To be a settlement member, a ﬁnancial
institution must be a shareholder and have a settle-
ment account with the CLS Bank. At this time, the
Royal Bank of Canada is the only Canadian share-
holder that is a settlement member, although others
intend to become settlement members in the future. In
addition, several LVTS participants currently provide
nostro services. The Royal Bank of Canada and the
CIBC are Canadian-dollar liquidity providers.
Contingency arrangements in Canada
The explicit links created between payments systems
and participants in different countries by the design of
the CLS system have the potential to quickly spread
the impact of operational failures both domestically
and internationally. Therefore, during the develop-
ment of the CLS Bank, system resiliency, backup, and
contingency arrangements have been a major focus of
the CLS, APS operators, participants, and central banks.
Despite these arrangements to prevent or mitigate
operational failures and their impact, problems could
17.  See Dingle (1998) for a more complete discussion of the LVTS.
occur in the LVTS or within a Canadian participant’s
proprietary CLS-  or LVTS-related system. Given the
narrow time frames for settlement, it may not always
be feasible, for example, for a settlement member to
make alternative arrangements for pay-ins, or for a
participant in the LVTS, or the LVTS itself, to move
operations to a backup site in the desired time frame.
There may also be circumstances where software
problems might be replicated on both sites. The Bank
of Canada is prepared to assist in these situations, if
necessary, by entering payments directly across the
CLSBank’s andparticipants’settlementaccounts with
the Bank of Canada, in effect circumventing the nor-
mal payment infrastructure.
The Bank of Canada acts as banker
for the CLS Bank
[for Canadian dollars].
The Bank of Canada’s role
The Bank of Canada acts as banker for the CLS Bank,
providing it with two main services. The ﬁrst is a set-
tlement account that the CLS Bank uses to make and
receive Canadian-dollar payments arising from the
continuous linked settlement service. Because of the
design of the CLS Bank, its settlement account will
never be negative, and it will not have overnight
balances except in very rare circumstances. Second,
because the CLS Bank is not a member of the Cana-
dian Payments Association, the Bank of Canada
makes and receives payments through the LVTS on its
behalf. To provide these services to the CLS Bank dur-
ing the settlement cycle and to perform other routine
services related to the operation of the LVTS, the Bank
of Canada has extended its operating hours to begin
7 hours earlier. The Banking Services section of the
Bank of Canada now operates from midnight to 1930
(EST) each business day.
Conclusion
Through the co-operative efforts of private sector
ﬁnancial institutions, central banks, and domestic
payments systems operators, the CLS Bank has been24 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2002
created to address the risks associated with settling
foreign exchange transactions, particularly credit risk,
which is virtually eliminated for transactions settling
through its system. The world’s largest foreign-
exchange-dealing institutions are shareholders of CLS,
and it is expected that most will interact directly
or indirectly with it. The addition of several other
currenciesandgrowingparticipationhavethepotential
to position the CLS Bank as the dominant global
mechanism for settling foreign exchange transactions.
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Appendix:
The Lamfalussy Report
Minimum standards for the design and
operation of cross-border and multi-
currency netting and settlement schemes
(BIS 1990)
1. Netting schemes should have a well-founded
legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions.
2. Netting scheme participants should have a clear
understanding of the impact of the particular
scheme on each of the ﬁnancial risks affected by
the netting process.
3. Multilateral netting systems should have clearly
deﬁned procedures for the management of credit
risks and liquidity risks which specify the respec-
tive responsibilities of the netting provider and
the participants. These procedures should also
ensure that all parties have both the incentives
and the capabilities to manage and contain each
of the risks they bear and that limits are placed
on the maximum level of credit exposure that can
be produced by each participant.
4. Multilateral netting systems should, at a mini-
mum, be capable of ensuring the timely comple-
tion of daily settlements in the event of an
inability to settle by the participant with the larg-
est single net-debit position.
5. Multilateral netting systems should have objec-
tive and publicly disclosed criteria for admission
which permit fair and open access.
6. All netting schemes should ensure the opera-
tional reliability of technical systems and the
availability of backup facilities capable of com-
pleting daily processing requirements.
Principles for co-operative central bank
oversight of cross-border and multi-
currency netting and settlement schemes
1. All central banks with an interest in the prudent
design and management of the scheme should be
informed of the netting or settlement system. This
would normally include (i) the central banks
associated with the currencies operating in the
system; (ii) the “host-country” central bank, the
central bank of the domestic market in which the
scheme is located or operating; and (iii) the “home-
country” central bank(s) of the charter or incor-
poration of both the participants and the netting
scheme provider.
2. One central bank should be the primary overseer
of the scheme, presumably but not necessarily,
the central bank of the host country.
3. The primary overseer should review the design
and operation of the system as a whole and con-
sult with other relevant authorities initially and
on a continuing periodic basis.
4. The determination of the adequacy of a system’s
settlement and risk-management procedures
should be the joint responsibility of the central
banks whose currencies are included in the sys-
tem as well as the primary overseer.
5. In the absence of conﬁdence in the soundness of
the design or management of the scheme, a cen-
tral bank should discourage its use by those insti-
tutions subject to its authority.